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COMMENT
COMMENT: THE ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS
TO ARBITRATE
IRVING KOVARSKY*
Three 1960 Supreme Court decisions' have limited the ability of
litigants to challenge successfully the jurisdiction and award-making
powers of labor arbitrators. The limitations imposed by the Court
upon the judiciary's power to question the arbitrator, a reversal of
traditional procedure, is of great significance and will unquestionably
necessitate some readjustment on the part of management. This article
attempts to place these recent developments in perspective and to
suggest briefly certain practical changes in the attitudes of courts and
contract negotiators that may result from them.
I. BACKGROUND
Because of the limited union growth and bargaining power prior
to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,2 management, with few
exceptions, was able to dominate and exercise unilateral control over
most internal plant matters. As unionism grew, the employer's ability
to control his labor force was greatly reduced, particularly since
good faith bargaining was required over wages, hours, and working
conditions. The collective bargaining agreements that were drawn up
contained clauses by which many controversies were submitted to
arbitration and the power of the firm waned.
Yet, because of the widespread notion that many industrial decisions
are strictly management prerogatives, the firm was able to keep many
disputes from reaching the arbitrator. Disagreement followed as to
the types of disputes that were arbitrable by agreement. During the
past two and a half decades the traditional notions of contract law
have tended to preserve the power of the firm, a result agreeable to
management personnel. However, with the 1960 Supreme Court
decisions, further inroads have been made on managemenf preroga-
tives and, once again, it can be anticipated that a period of labor-
*Department of Management, Southern Illinois University.
1. United Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.*, 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
2. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (now Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1958)).
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management adjustment will be necessary.
3
When the Labor Management Relations Act was promulgated in
1947, section 301 provided:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
.. may be brought in any district court... .4
In the famous and controversial Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills5 decision, Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion, noted
that Congress approved of arbitration as a democratic means of maxi-
mizing plant justice and labor-management peace, and that section 301
must be considered in this light.6 He also said that the courts charged
with enforcing federal legislation would be required to fashion a body
of rules, obviously in a piece-meal fashion, to implement this national
policy favoring arbitration.7 As could be anticipated, although labor
arbitration is a desirable phenomenon worthy of protection and en-
couragement, the grant of power to judges to carve out ad hoc ground-
rules created many legal problems.
One criticism levied at Lincoln Mills concerned the extensive rule-
making power which the Supreme Court handed to the judiciary
without spelling out in detail any guiding criteria. This mandate to
the lower courts was criticized both by scholars adhering to the view
usually taken by Justice Frankfurter, who would limit the judicial
role wherever possible, and by others who view labor-management
problems with a less legalistic philosophical approach due to the lack
of judicial or legislative guidance in the field.9 The sparseness of
legislative guidance is noticeable: the Labor Management Relations
Act does no more than express a policy favoring arbitration and the
United States Arbitration Act has been interpreted to exclude employ-
ment contracts from coverage.'0
3. It is not intended to imply that management fully adjusted to the shift
in power prior to 1960.
4. 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
5. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
6. Id. at 456.
7. Id. at 457.
8. Justice Douglas stated: "The Labor Management Relations Act expressly
furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may
not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of
express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but
will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a
remedy that will effectuate that policy....
"It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal
rights are concerned... ." Ibid.
9. It should be pointed out that there is little procedural aid in the Taft-
Hartley Act even though mentioned in Lincoln Mills as a source of guidance.
See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957).
10. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry.
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Another criticism levied at the sweeping concept enunciated
in Lincoln Mills was that a motion to stay or compel arbitration sub-
jects the arbitrator to the whims of the court. To some degree this
argument is unrealistic. The social impact of labor-management prob-
lems is often overlooked by those leveling a jaundiced eye toward the
legalistic approach and those expressing concern with the need of
the arbitrator for complete autonomy. It is true that courts have
needlessly badgered the arbitration process in many ways. Yet, if
industrial peace can be maximized by the limited procedural inter-
ference of the judiciary to force labor and management to live up to
the terms of their agreements to arbitrate, society is the winner."
The so-called Cutler-Hammer doctrine, 12 first enunciated by a state
court in New York, has been followed, at least to some extent, by
federal courts.13 In Cutler-Hammer, the meaning of a contractual
provision, "to discuss payment," was disputed; the New York court
affirmed the view that the judiciary would decide what is arbitrable. 14
Under this view courts necessarily determine the merits of every dis-
pute submitted to arbitration.
Employers obviously favor the approach taken in Cutler-Hammer
because of the protection it gives to some degree to management pre-
Employees, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952); International Union United Furniture
Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948);
Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944); Lewittes & Sons v.
United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); General Elec.
Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957). The position
taken by the courts when interpreting section 1 of the Arbitration Act has
been quarreled with. Section 1 excludes from coverage "contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers ... "
It can be argued that a collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of
employment-its purpose is to spell out the rights of those entering into an
employer-employee relationship. Only an employee can negotiate an employ-
ment contract; it is then given the protection of the master agreement, the
collective bargaining contract. This was the view expressed in Local 205,
United Elec. Workers v. General Elec., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956). Al-
though affirming this decision (353 U.S. 547), the Supreme Court disagreed
with the reasoning of the First Circuit and held that section 301 furnishes the
substantive law necessary to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. For recom-
mendations that the Federal Arbitration Act should be amended to cover this
situation see Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act and the Lincoln
Mills Case, 42 MINN. L. REv. 333 (1958).
11. In two of the three 1960 decisions, later reviewed, the Supreme Court
was concerned with enforcing agreements to arbitrate. If the basic proposi-
tion in Lincoln Mills-the desirability of promoting arbitration as a means of
settling disagreements between labor and management-is accepted, then
enforcing agreements to arbitrate, in the last analysis, may result in less
court interference at a subsequent date.
12. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 297 N.Y. 519,
74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
13. See, e.g., Davenport v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1957).
14. Judge Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the
majority opinion and took a position which was later followed by Justice
Douglas in United Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., supra note 1.
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rogatives with a resultant retention of unilateral employer control.
The courts have displayed a traditional hostility to arbitration, and
employers are aware of judicial attitudes. Unions on the other hand
oppose any limitation on the authority of arbitrators who have
exhibited a more realistic and favorable approach to problems. Be-
cause of the anti-labor views historically expressed by courts, union
leaders have been critical of Cutler-Hammer as another indication of
judicial bias.
II. THE THREE 1960 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Against the background of widespread speculation and confusion
surrounding Lincoln Mills and the controversial implications of
Cutler-Hammer, the Supreme Court, in 1960, undertook the task of
providing "markers" for the judiciary when dealing with arbitrability
and the scope of court review under section 301. These decisions will
now be examined.
The American Case
In United Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co.,15 the collective
bargaining contract contained an "all disputes" provision "as to the
meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this agree-
ment. 16 Included in the agreement were clauses giving management
the right to punish employees "for cause"; promotion and employment
were to be determined by seniority "where ability and efficiency are
equal.' 7 It should be noted that these are standard clauses found in
many labor-management agreements. An employee, awarded work-
men's compensation benefits, later claimed reinstatement via the
seniority clause. The employer refused to reinstate the employee and,
in addition, refused to arbitrate. Both the district court and the court
of appeals denied, for different reasons, the union's request for an
order to arbitrate. The district court invoked the doctrine of estoppel
while the court of appeals referred to the employee's claim as frivo-
lous.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions and referred
to section 203 (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act which favors arbitration as
a means of settling disputes. Since the collective bargaining agree-
ment contained an "all disputes" provision, even frivolous claims are
arbitrable according to the Court. Justice Douglas, writing the ma-
jority opinion, stated:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed
15. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
16. Id. at 565.
17. Id. at 566.
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to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is
confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a
claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving
party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the
arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not be de-
prived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all
that it connotes that was bargained for.18
The Supreme Court ruled that if arbitrators are contractually em-
powered to adjudicate the dispute, even frivolous claims or claims
subject to estoppel are within his jurisdiction.
Justice Douglas felt that some courts were guilty of unwarranted
"preoccupation with ordinary contract law," and that the proper
course to steer should be determined by market place realities.19 The
majority favored what might be called a realistic approach in con-
tradiction to the contractual view expressed in Cutler-Hammer.
Justice Brennan in a concurring opinion made reference to the
position taken by Justice Douglas that "there is no exception in the
'no-strike' clause and none therefore should be read into the grievance
clause, since one is the quid pro quo for the other."20 Justice Brennan
felt:
The Court makes reference to an arbitration clause being the quid pro
quo for a no-strike clause. I do not understand the Court to mean that
the application of the principles announced today depends upon the
presence of a no-strike clause in the agreement.21
The Warrior Case
In United Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,22
the employer furloughed a number of employees after certain plant
maintenance work was let to independent contractors.2 The inde-
pendent contractors then hired some of the furloughed employees at a
reduced wage rate. Included in the collective bargaining contract
were "no-strike" and "all disputes" provisions, but excluded from
arbitration were all legal issues and management functions. The
employer refused to arbitrate the layoffs and the union petitioned the
court for an order to enforce the arbitration clause.
The Supreme Court, emphasizing the need for an industrial common
18. Id. at 567-68. Is it proper to distinguish between a "frivolous grievance"
and a "frivolous claim that a grievance is within the scope of the agreement"?
See ARBITRATION AN PUBLIc PoLicy 14 (Pollard ed. 1961).
19. 363 U.S. at 567.
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 573.
22. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
23. It should be noted that the contracting-out of work is one means by
which the effectiveness of union organization can be limited and could,
carried to the extreme, lead to the breaking of unions.
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law, noted that a collective bargaining agreement differs from a con-
tract entered into between business firms because of the possible dis-
ruptive effects on labor-management harmony and the attendant
coercive possibilities which such an agreement contains. As a conse-
quence, the grievance procedure culminating in arbitration is an in-
tegral and essential part of every union-management agreement as a
means of keeping industrial peace. The Court recognized the plain
fact that agreements are often unclear and incomplete; now, all doubt
should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Thus, Cutler-Hammer, as
legal ideology, was buried on a federal level.
Justice Douglas again exhibited concern with the "no-strike" feature
of the agreement and said:
When ... an absolute no-strike clause is included in the agreement, then
in a very real sense everything that management does is subject to the
agreement, for either management is prohibited or limited in the action
it takes, or if not, it is protected from interference by strikes ... .24
In other words, a "no-strike" agreement is the quid pro quo for an
agreement to arbitrate. Justice Brennan did not write a concurring
opinion in Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. but indicated in American
Mfg. Co.25 that the view therein expressed applied to Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co. and Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.
In Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., the defendant argued that the
clause, "strictly a function of management," authorized the unilateral
contracting of work to an independent firm. The Supreme Court de-
cided that the assignment of work to an outside firm and the resultant
layoffs are arbitrable unless the agreement specifically provides for an
exclusion.26 The Court recognized that the meaning of "strictly a
function of management" is nebulous. Yet evidence, not expressed in
writing, was available indicating that the contracting-out of work was
deemed to be a management function by the litigants.
Justice Whittaker, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the letting
out of work was clearly a management function because the union
unsuccessfully tried for nineteen years "to induce the employer to
24. 363 U.S. at 583.
25. United Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569
(1960).
26. 363 U.S. at 584-85. "A specific collective bargaining agreement may
exclude contracting out from the grievance procedure. Or a written collateral
agreement may make clear that contracting out was not a matter for arbitra-
tion. In such a case a grievance based solely on contracting out would not
be arbitrable. Here, however, there is no such provision. Nor is there any
showing that the parties designed the phrase 'strictly a function of manage-
ment' to encompass any and all forms of contracting out. In the absence of
any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we
think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim
from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here, the exclusion
clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad ....
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agree to a covenant that would prohibit it from contracting out
work .... "27 It should be noted that the opinion written by Justice
Douglas failed to mention the nineteen year bargaining history. Jus-
tice Whittaker also felt that the majority opinion violated sound con-
tract law which prohibits courts from writing agreements for parties
engaged in litigation and that arbitrability is always a judicial ques-
tion.2
The majority position taken in Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. can
be buttressed by examining historical developments since 1935. As a
matter of fact management prerogatives, whatever they may be, have
been sharply restricted by contract since section 9(a) required the
employer to bargain in good faith over "rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment." It is difficult to
envision what management functions do not ultimately affect wages,
hours and working conditions. Although management and many
textbooks and articles speak in terms of management prerogatives,
none of these voices stop to define them in light of the Taft-Hartley
Act. Certainly many public officials, union leaders, arbitrators, and
labor economists have a notion differing from that of management as
to the meaning of "management functions."29 What may have been
considered a management function twenty-five years ago is not
necessarily controlling today. The fact that employers and unions are
required to bargain in good faith by law creates a changing concept
of management prerogatives even though an agreement is not clear.
The Enterprise Case
In United Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 30
several employees were discharged for participating in a temporary
walkout. The union successfully petitioned the district court for an
order to enforce the arbitration proviso, and the arbitrator decided
that discharge-the capital punishment of the industrial world-was
too harsh a penalty. The question ultimately presented to the Su-
preme Court was whether the arbitrator could award back pay and
reinstate the employees from the date that the collective bargaining
agreement had expired. Justice Douglas, again presenting the ma-
jority view, said:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the col-
lective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand
27. Id. at 588.
28. It should be noted that whether stated or not, the jurisdiction of an
arbitrator is questionable under the majority opinion. The real question is
the extent to which the courts will question the arbitrator.
29. See, e.g., GOLDBERG, MANAGEmENT'S RESERVED RIGHTS-A LABOR VIEW IN
MANAGEmENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 118 (McKelvey ed. 1956).
30. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement... 31
In this case it was not clear whether the arbitrator had exceeded his
authority. Stating that all doubts should be resolved in his favor, the
Court held the award enforceable.
Justice Douglas felt that the arbitrator may have acted rightfully
because the grievance arose prior to the expiration date of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and the award could "be read as embodying
a construction of the agreement itself .... -32 Furthermore the deci-
sion in Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. is understandable in the light
of the need to maintain industrial peace.33
III. ANTICIPATED EFFECTS
The right of the judiciary to question arbitration procedure has
been clipped by the three 1960 Supreme Court decisions. Together
with Lincoln Mills, the three 1960 Supreme Court decisions stand for
the basic proposition that the courts will favor the arbitration process
if at all feasible. Labor economists, long critical of judicial interfer-
ence with arbitration and unconcerned with legal doctrine, will re-
joice, while many persons steeped in legal lore will regret the curb
placed on courts3 4 and the absence of a forum to question the arbi-
trator.
It seems to this writer that the three 1960 Supreme Court decisions
will not prevent the judiciary from reviewing arbitrability to the
extent feared by some.35 Courts will guard their prerogatives and
control as zealously as management. Judges have long exhibited an
uncanny, positive ability to protect extensive areas of judicial inquiry
31. Id. at 597.
32. Id. at 598.
33. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining,
28 U. CHi. L. REv. 464, 482 (1961). Professor Meltzer argues that the union,
even after the collective bargaining contract expired, retained majority status
(noted by Justice Douglas, 363 U.S. at 595) and could have subjected the
employer to economic reprisal.
34. Id. at 473. Professor Meltzer, expressing the judicial viewpoint at least
to some extent, indignantly states: "Lincoln Mills gives an ironic twist to the
Court's view that labor arbitrators are giants in dealing with the exotic mys-
teries of the labor agreement, while even the best courts are dwarfs. It is
strange that courts, competent to fashion a new law for the labor agreement,
are so unqualified to deal with the "merits" of grievances that they cannot be
trusted to enforce a pervasive obligation of good faith in the context of
controversies over arbitrability."
35. 45 MiwN. L. REv. 282, 289 (1960). "Another shortcoming . . . is the
fact that the Court so emphatically restricted the lower courts' power to go
into the merits of a dispute that they may be reluctant to do so even in
circumstances which would fall within those approved . . . in Warrior."
Based upon judicial history this seems an unlikely result, for courts have been
reluctant to relinquish control to arbitrators.
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(the need for some flexibility rather than a fixed non-intervention
policy is not denied). One available means of retaining control of the
arbitration process is obviously suggested in Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp.-the decision-making authority of the arbitrator must stem from
the collective bargaining contract. 36 When is the arbitrator acting
under the guise of contractual authority? As indicated in Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., this may be difficult to determine. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co. states that disputes are not arbitrable when specifically
excluded by contract. When are disputes specifically excluded from
arbitration? Furthermore, when is a contract ambiguous and when
does it fail completely to authorize the arbitrator to make a decision?
It can be anticipated that judicial attitudes and environments will
limit the broad sweep of the 1960 decisions.
Admittedly the Supreme Court decisions will prevent judicial
inquiry in many instances. Yet the federal courts have already found
reasons to safeguard traditional judicial prerogatives. In Vulcan-
Cincinnati, Inc. v. Steelworkers Union, 7 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the violation of a no-strike clause by a union is
not arbitrable because the grievance procedure was not extended by
contract to quarrels between the union and management. Similar
decisions have been reached by other courts. 38
A district court has refused to order arbitration even though the
dispute, within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, was covered by a col-
lective bargaining contract.39 If the submission is sufficiently broad to
permit the arbitrator to consider past practices unrelated to the pres-
ent agreement, the employer cannot be compelled to arbitrate.40 The
penalty imposed by an employer against an employee cannot be
changed where the submission only authorizes the arbitrator "to
determine whether good cause for some disciplinary action existed,
the determination of the appropriate action to be taken expressly
reserved to management."' 41 An award granting holiday pay can be
36. 363 U.S. at 597. See also Local 201, Elec. Workers Union v. General
Elec. Co., 283 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1960).
37. 289 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1961).
38. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961); Drake
Bakeries, Inc., v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 287 F.2d 155 (2d Cir.
1961); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Local 1717, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 194
F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Penn. 1961). But see Lodge 700, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. United Aircraft Corp., 193 F. Supp. 69 (Conn. 1961).
39. Local 1357, Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 48 L.R.R.M. 2284
(E.D. Penn. 1961). But see Local 50, American Bakery Workers v. Ward
Baking Co., 48 L.R.R.M. 2695 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Local 557, Freight Drivers Union
v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 48 L.R.R.M. 2783 (Mass. 1961).
40. Proctor & Gamble Independent Union v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 48
L.R.R.M. 2443 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
41. Local 1386, Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d




set aside if the contract fails to clothe the arbitrator with authority
to penalize the employer.42 If a written grievance signed by the local
and employer is required by contract, arbitration will not be ordered
by the court when the firm signs and the local does not.
43
Because of the "escapes" and uncertainties already indicated, liti-
gants will frequently seek declaratory judgments44 or bring suits
45
to determine if arbitration is in order. As is often said by the master
of ceremonies: "And it's only the beginning, folks."
Another possible effect of the three Supreme Court decisions is
that many employers may attempt to curtail the decision-making
power of the arbitrator by carefully wording submissions. 46 Because
the agreement to arbitrate favors the union, management will seek,
where possible, to limit the role of the arbitrator. Whether the three
decisions are applicable to submissions was not indicated by the
Supreme Court. In addition courts may be asked more frequently in
the future to review the arbitrator's authority as stipulated in the
submission.
Without question attorneys representing management will seek,
by contract, specifically to exclude certain types of grievances from
the arbitration process and will no longer rely on the vague catch-all
management prerogatives clauses. In some respects this highly legal-
istic approach to arbitration and collective bargaining is paradoxical;
one reason often advanced for the need for arbitration is to maintain
flexibility and to prevent a hardened rules-type approach to labor
relations. Although the 1960 Supreme Court decisions go far in
protecting the autonomy of the arbitrator, they will be instrumental
in producing a more detailed and technical type of contract which
may limit the flexibility needed to deal with union-management
problems.
42. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. International Chem. Workers, 48
L.R.R.M. 2616 (W.D. La. 1961).
43. Local 201, Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers Union v. General Elec.
Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 2002 (1st Cir. 1960).
44. Radio Corp. of America v. Association of Professional Engineering Per-
sonnel, 48 L.R.R.M. 2270 (3d Cir. 1961); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local
400, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 286 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1960).
45. Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292
F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1961); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Local 400, Int'l
Union of Elec. Workers, 290 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1961); Local 95, Office Employees
Union v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 287 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1961); American
Brake Shoe Co. v. Local 149, U.A.W., 285 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961); Local 183,
American Newspaper Guild v. Hammond Publishing Co., 48 L.R.RM. 2577
(N.D. Ind. 1961); Proctor & Gamble Independent Union v. Proctor & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 48 L.R.R.M. 2446 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Office Employees Union v. Ward-
Garcia Corp., 190 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Retail Store Employees v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 2354 (W.D. Wash. 1960); Local 18, Mine Workers v.
American Smelting & Refining Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 2269 (Idaho 1960); UAW v.
Waltham Screw Co., 47 L.R.R.M. 2196 (Mass. 1960).
46. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir.
1961).
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